Mo. Official’s Indictment Tests Limits Of Federal Bribery Laws

The indictment alleged that LeVota offered a rival candidate a county position in exchange for dropping out of the 2026 county executive race against him. LeVota was charged with honest services wire fraud, federal program bribery, Travel Act violations and making false statements to the FBI.[1] Last week, he moved to dismiss four of the five charges.

The indictment is a cautionary tale for politicians and their counsel about the federal risks lurking beneath what many may view as politics as usual. The case is also one for the defense bar to watch, as it will likely raise questions about the scope of federal bribery and fraud statutes.

Specifically, U.S. v. Levota raises the question of whether an offer or promise by one candidate for public office to a second candidate to withdraw from an election constitutes something of value that can be part of an illegal bribery quid pro quo with a public official.

The Allegations and Charges

According to the indictment, Jackson County, Missouri, which includes Kansas City, operates under a home rule charter vesting executive power in the county executive. In October 2025, the county Legislature selected LeVota as interim county executive to serve until Dec. 31, 2026.[2]

The government alleges that between approximately March 16 and March 31, LeVota devised a scheme to deprive the citizens of Jackson County of his honest services “through bribery and the concealment of material information” by promising to place his rival candidate and another individual in full-time county-level positions in exchange for the rival candidate abandoning the 2026 county executive election.[3]

According to the indictment, LeVota met the other candidate at a bar in Kansas City, Missouri, on a Friday afternoon on March 27. LeVota allegedly questioned the candidate’s ability to win the nomination and expressed concern about their relationship if he ran against him, and the candidate responded that he “would rather have a job where [he’s] earning six figures … if [he were] to drop out.”[4]

The rival candidate allegedly stated that he would “love to be the Parks Director,” and LeVota allegedly stated, “You will be the Parks Director. There’s no question. It’s only when.”[5]

According to the indictment, they agreed on a salary of $165,000, and LeVota allegedly confirmed the agreement by adding, “This is how things are supposed to be done … this is how it works.”[6] LeVota also allegedly agreed to place the candidate’s colleague in a separate county position.[7]

A few days later, on March 30, the rival candidate allegedly confirmed the deal via text message: “I am agreeing to withdraw from the race in return for the positions and salary discussed,”[8] and LeVota responded, “Let’s be clear, you are not withdrawing in return for anything. If you choose to withdraw because that’s what’s best for Jackson County then that’s your decision. I always want to have quality people working for the country so I would love to talk to you about that in the future.”[9]

LeVota then allegedly called the candidate to inform him “that’s not a good thing to have in writing,” and “to, say that you’re withdrawing in exchange for specific things, that’s not what we’re saying in writing.”[10]

The indictment does not allege whether the rival candidate in fact withdrew from the race. And, according to the indictment, when other candidates entered the race, LeVota allegedly encouraged him to stay in the race longer, but added that it would not “change anything with you and I on your future and what I want you to do and what you want to do, with me.”[11]

The indictment charges LeVota with five counts: (1) honest services wire fraud;[12] (2) federal program bribery, alleging that LeVota corruptly solicited and accepted a thing of value by agreeing to provide the rival candidate and another person full-time government positions in exchange for the candidate’s abandonment of the election;[13] (3) Travel Act violations for text messages sent on March 26;[14] (4) Travel Act violations for text messages sent on March 30;[15] and (5) false statements to the FBI for statements made to special agents related to the investigation.[16]

Politics as Usual or Federal Bribery?

The LeVota case raises multiple interesting questions that could test the scope and application of the federal bribery statutes in the context of an election-related quid pro quo, specifically where a candidate is accused of promising a position to another candidate if the second candidate withdraws from a race.

A key element of the charges against LeVota is that he must have promised his rival candidate a government appointment in exchange for something of value, raising the question of whether withdrawing from an election constitutes something of value under the law.

Honest services fraud requires bribery or kickbacks to violate the statute. Indeed, in Skilling v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2010 that the honest services fraud statute “covers only bribery and kickback schemes” because “[c]onstruing the … statute to extend beyond that core meaning … would encounter a vagueness shoal.”[17]

As Skilling itself did not prescribe the elements of honest-services fraud kickbacks, some courts have imported the elements of the federal bribery statute,[18] which includes the requirement that the corrupt offer or promise be in exchange for “anything of value personally or for any other person or entity.”[19]

The federal program bribery statute includes a similar requirement.[20] That provision applies to agents of state or local governments, or organizations that obtain more than $10,000 in federal benefits in a one-year period. One of the required elements is that the person “corruptly solicit[] or demand[] for the benefit of any person, or accept[] or agree[] to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of such government or organization involving “any thing of value of $5,000 or more.”[21]

In other words, the agent of the state or local government or organization receiving public assistance must receive something of value in exchange for the official act.[22]

Thus, LeVota will likely argue that the rival candidate’s withdrawal from the election is not something of value that could implicate the charged bribery statutes.

The indictment seeks to satisfy this requirement by alleging that LeVota sought to “enrich himself by soliciting, accepting, and agreeing to accept things of value from” the rival candidate.[23] But whether a rival candidate’s agreement to withdraw from an election constitutes a thing of value under federal law is a novel question.

The alleged thing of value is essentially reduced competition in a local election, not traditional money or property, and the electorate must still vote to elect LeVota before he will receive compensation for his position. Thus, LeVota would likely argue that compensation as county executive is not itself received merely because the rival candidate withdraws from the election, and he may further argue that he earned any compensation he received.

While the alleged promise of an appointment of the rival candidate to a lucrative position could be an official act, satisfying one half of the required quid pro quo, it is unclear whether a court would agree that the withdrawal from the race is sufficient to constitute a thing of value that could be promised in exchange for the job appointment.

Practical Takeaways and Reasons to Watch the Case Closely

Although LeVota may have arguments as to why the other candidate’s withdrawal from the race is not something of value, the government plainly holds the view that offering a rival candidate a job in exchange for withdrawal from a race violates the federal bribery laws.

Thus, while field-clearing conversations and job offers to political rivals may periodically occupy the news cycle — typically without leading to a prosecution — politicians and counsel advising political candidates should pay close attention to this area of the law and assess potential legal exposure.

For defense practitioners, the LeVota case sits at the intersection of several unsettled areas of law. Whether a candidate’s withdrawal can constitute a thing of value within the scope of honest services fraud or other bribery statutes has no clear precedent.

Regardless of the outcome, the case will have important implications on the scope of conduct that the federal bribery laws encompass. For instance, based on the prosecution theory in LeVota, would a presidential candidate’s promise to a rival that they can be in the cabinet if they drop from the primary election and endorse the candidate constitute federal bribery?

The line between political strategy and criminal bribery may become muddied in such cases.

The Supreme Court could someday take an interest in this area of the law, as the court has frequently cautioned against novel applications of the federal fraud statutes, including in Ciminelli v. U.S. in 2023,[24] Kelly v. U.S. in 2020,[25] Skilling,[26] Cleveland v. U.S. in 2000,[27] and McNally v. U.S. in 1987.[28]

The Supreme Court has also taken pains to ensure that the federal bribery statutes do not impinge upon certain political discourse, including in its 2016 decision in McDonnell v. U.S., where it clarified the official act requirement in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Section 201(b).[29] Thus, a high court decision on the scope of the “anything of value” requirement, and whether it applies to intangible types of benefits that are not easily assigned a monetary value, could significantly affect the legal landscape in this area.

In the meantime, defense counsel in similar cases should look for opportunities to challenge an indictment for failure to state an offense so that the district court may need to determine early in the case whether the government’s prosecution theory is legally valid.

Defense counsel can also argue that the more tenuous alleged schemes violate the due process clause’s fair warning requirement, to the extent that they can persuade the court that a reasonable person would not have fair notice that the alleged conduct is unlawful.

Selective prosecution could also present a potential argument if the government does not pursue similar prosecutions of individuals who reportedly engaged in similar conduct.

As trial nears, defense counsel should likewise focus on jury instructions and motions in limine to define the scope of the thing of value and the quid pro quo requirements. At the end of the day, the jury’s verdict could turn on whether they view such schemes as politics as usual or a corrupt quid pro quo bribery scheme that violates federal law.

Originally published by Law360.

[1] Indictment, United States v. LeVota, No. 4:26-cr-00338-RK (W.D. Mo. July 16, 2026), ECF No. 1 (“Indictment”).

[2] Id. ¶ 1.

[3] Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 10-22.

[4] Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.

[5] Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.

[6] Id. ¶ 18.

[7] Id. ¶ 21.

[8] Id. ¶ 23(a).

[9] Id.

[10] Id. ¶ 23(b).

[11] Id. ¶ 25.

[12] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 1349.

[13] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[14] 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).

[15] 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).

[16] 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

[17] Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).

[18] 18 U.S.C. § 201.

[19] See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1), (2); United States v. Suhl, 885 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2018) (“In this case, the parties agree that § 201 provides the elements of honest-services bribery.”).

[20] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[21] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[22] The Travel Act includes a similar requirement, as it alleges the use of iMessages sent in interstate commerce to promote violations of a Missouri state statute, § 576.020, which makes it a crime for a public servant to solicit, accept, or agree to accept “any benefit, direct or indirect, in return for” certain official acts. M.S. Ann. § 576.020.

[23] Indictment ¶ 3.

[24] Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023).

[25] Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391 (2020).

[26] Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).

[27] Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).

[28] McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).

[29] McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016).