Eleventh Circuit Affirms Preliminary Injunction Against Non-Signatories Who Helped Former Owner Violate Noncompete and Build Competing Business

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding irreparable harm or in applying the same geographic scope as the former owner’s stipulated injunction to the non-signatory defendants.

Background

Andrew Mayer founded Murphy Pipeline Contractors, LLC, a company that rehabilitates municipal water and sewer lines using specialized trenchless technology, including a proprietary process called “CompressionFit.” In 2020, Mayer sold Murphy to PURIS, LLC for $55 million and remained as its president with nationwide management responsibility. As part of the sale, Mayer signed a noncompete agreement barring him from competing with Murphy, soliciting its customers, recruiting its employees, or supporting a competing business for the term of his employment and 18 months thereafter. The noncompete defined a “Restricted Territory” reaching 50 miles around “any and all Company locations” where Mayer was assigned or had responsibility, as well as customer account locations he handled.

Within months of the sale, Mayer resolved to “get [his] company back.” His plan was memorialized in a document he titled “THE PLAN,” in which he described becoming the “silent partner” of CMG Pipelines, Inc., a local Louisiana contractor owned by Carmelo Gutierrez. CMG was set up to gather experience in the same fields as Murphy, and Mayer used his position as Murphy’s president to direct subcontracts and business opportunities to CMG, share information about Murphy’s projects, and help CMG obtain an exclusive license for competing trenchless technology. By 2024, CMG was bidding on trenchless projects in markets where it had not previously operated, and Mayer facilitated a potential sale of CMG for $30 million. CMG also hired at least 27 former Murphy employees and pursued Murphy’s customers. 

After discovering the scheme, PURIS sued Mayer in February 2025 and obtained a stipulated preliminary injunction against him barring trenchless work within 50 miles of 553 identified locations. PURIS then amended its complaint to add CMG and Gutierrez (the CMG Parties) and sought a separate injunction against them. The district court found a substantial likelihood that the CMG Parties had tortiously interfered with Mayer’s noncompete and entered a preliminary injunction virtually identical to Mayer’s, while exempting projects on which CMG had already performed substantial work.

Case Information

• Citation: PURIS, LLC v. CMG Pipelines, Inc., No. 25-14186, 2026 WL 2664378 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) 

• Plaintiffs: PURIS, LLC; Murphy Pipeline Contractors, LLC 

• Defendants: CMG Pipelines, Inc.; Carmelo Gutierrez 

• Judges: Per Curiam (Newsom, Lagoa, and Brasher, Circuit Judges)

Analysis

Irreparable Harm

The CMG Parties argued that PURIS failed to establish irreparable harm because its injuries could be remedied by monetary damages. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court’s finding of irreparable harm.

The court noted that the district court had before it an “extraordinarily strong showing” of coordinated conduct by Mayer and the CMG Parties. The injunction itself reflected the district court’s careful analysis: it allowed CMG to finish projects already underway while enjoining future trenchless work, recognizing that damages could likely address harm from completed projects, but that money could not easily remedy the ongoing conduct. The enjoined conduct included bidding on projects drawn from Murphy’s confidential pipeline and recruiting Murphy’s trained employees to pursue Murphy’s customers.

The court relied on established Eleventh Circuit precedent recognizing that while economic losses alone do not justify a preliminary injunction, “the loss of customers and goodwill is an irreparable injury.” Broader losses — such as poached employees, reputational damage, and a weakened competitive position — are “far more difficult (if not impossible)” to measure. The record showed Mayer’s plan contemplated giving CMG competing technology, projects, financing, and access to PURIS’ trained crews, and that Mayer and the CMG Parties were actively carrying out that plan with no intent to stop.

Scope of the Injunction

The CMG Parties also challenged the geographic scope of the injunction, arguing that “Company locations” in Mayer’s noncompete referred only to PURIS’ 16 corporate offices, and that even if the term were read more broadly, a non-signatory’s contract could not supply the boundaries for an injunction against them.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments. The court clarified that the district court had not “blindly enforced” Mayer’s contract against non-signatories. Rather, after finding that the CMG Parties had themselves committed tortious interference, the district court used the territory Mayer had accepted as a “starting point” and then independently considered whether to apply the same territory to the CMG Parties. PURIS’ CEO had identified 553 locations where PURIS performed or pursued pipeline work, and Mayer himself agreed that the same list would govern his own injunction. The CMG Parties offered no evidence to show that Mayer’s actual responsibilities were confined to 16 offices or that any particular location fell outside the work Mayer managed.

The court emphasized that “[c]rafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment,” and that a district court may “mold its decree to meet the exigencies of the particular case.” An injunction “can be therapeutic as well as protective” and may prohibit conduct that, “standing alone, would have been unassailable.” Because the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, the court concluded that the injunction fell within the district court’s considerable discretion.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the availability of preliminary injunctive relief against third parties who knowingly assist a restricted individual in violating noncompete obligations, even though those third parties never signed the agreement themselves. The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance confirms that tortious interference provides a viable theory for extending noncompete protections beyond the contracting parties, and that district courts retain broad discretion to craft the scope of equitable relief to match the scope of the wrongful conduct — including by adopting the same geographic boundaries as the underlying noncompete.